Taliban
of the 21st century
The Taliban’s
agility and ability to adapt has been remarkable. Their gradual acceptance to
of the fact that unrestricted violence would hurt their quest for
popular support, transformed into sophisticated
policy planning and implementation of developmental activities. Step -by -step, they revived and re-started
parts of their governance, and invented other systems through trial and error.
Much of this process appears to be from the ground-up and influenced by popular
demand and local experiences. Their leadership also proceeded to correct
many of the flaws and shortcomings that undermined their rule in the 1990s. The
ban on women and girls attending school has been removed, though most Taliban
officials claim that no ban ever existed, and have publicly stated that women
should have access to education. The ban on opium cultivation and its trade,
which was a disaster during their earlier government times is clearly no longer
in place, but the Taliban do not publicizeise this shift in policy and down-play
the opium connection in public. Other subtle differences are their stated
respect for other ethnic groups and their embrace of technology, limited as it
may be. Circumstances have radically changed for the Taliban since 2001,
and their policies and goals have shifted accordingly. Far from being a
revolutionary movement of the 1990s, prior to 2022, they considered themselves
as a deposed government and the main armed opposition fighting the pro-Western
government supported by foreign soldiers. The Taliban leadership itself has
also been transformed. Circumstances have forced them to travel outside their
villages and also outside the country at times, and they have learned from
their travels.
The simple
fighters of yester-years are worldly trained politicians
today,;
transforming themselves from being traditional conservatives into modern
Islamists. They have also become better at managing external perceptions,
having realised
that appearing as educated people is an advantage and it is
helpful in manipulating the media. They have become sophisticated;
with professional-standard glossy publications, a website in several languages,
videos made of high-quality production and highly capable spokesmen that
respond rapidly to questions and criticism across social media platforms like
Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp; even
though what is publicized on the social media is vastly
different from the ground reality in Afghanistan. What exactly do the changes
in Taliban policy means for Afghans and the future of
Afghanistan will depend on the critical study and analysis of their on-ground
actions. The Taliban are led by the Emir
ul-Mumenin (leader of the faithful), currently Mullah
Haibatullah Akhunzada. The scope and complexity of this position varies
according to the person who occupies it, and the current Emir’s functions are
more spiritual and political, than as an operational military
commander. He is assisted by two deputies, as well as the
leadership shura. At the provincial level, there
is a governor, appointed officially by the leadership shura.
The Taliban now has a quasi-–professional
core of individuals who have served for several years across multiple
provinces. These governors and local councils / commissions
are not completely ‘civilian’, and the governors may serve in a military
capacity to varying degrees depending on the context and broader requirements
of the office for local governance. Provincial ministers are appointed by the
leadership of the relevant council, viz,:
education, health and finance; in consultation with the governor of the
province. The system has grown more comprehensive over the years, with a dozen
committees, some with multiple departments covering a multitude of issues.
Significant autonomy is granted to province and district- level
officials within the overall framework of the policy.
This flexibility
is intentional, in order to accommodate different views and reduce dissent to as little as possible. It also helps to prevent
the Taliban from splitting into different factions; since
local politics and preferences based on history play a significant role in
governance. Some areas might have a higher demand for health services than
others, while others might want to give priority to education. The extent to
which services have been available in the past also matters. Areas
where customary structures of governance are influential and respected,
are in a stronger position to bargain for amenities from the Taliban officials.
Individual relationships also influence policies, although the Taliban does not
generally welcome individual opinions, since such interactions could be
perceived as corruption. In practice however, the Taliban rely on
relationships in every aspect of their governance, due to a lack of trust in
general and the widespread suspicion of their motives by the locals and the
international interlocutors. Arrangements between the Taliban and civilians are
based on a mutual yet unequal exchange, leading to an informal social contract
that renders to the Taliban a legitimate authority,
and strengthening its credibility as an acceptable form of government; even
though it is not a government- based
on the choice and free will of the people of Afghanistan.
The Taliban’s
agility and ability to adapt has been remarkable. Their gradual acceptance of the fact that unrestricted violence would hurt their quest for
popular support, transformed into sophisticated
policy planning and implementation of developmental activities. Step -by -step, they revived and re-started
parts of their governance, and invented other systems through trial and error.
Much of this process appears to be from the ground-up and influenced by popular
demand and local experiences. Their leadership also proceeded to correct
many of the flaws and shortcomings that undermined their rule in the 1990s. The
ban on women and girls attending school has been removed, though most Taliban
officials claim that no ban ever existed, and have publicly stated that women
should have access to education. The ban on opium cultivation and its trade,
which was a disaster during their earlier government times is clearly no longer
in place, but the Taliban do not publicize this shift in policy and down-play
the opium connection in public. Other subtle differences are their stated
respect for other ethnic groups and their embrace of technology, limited as it
may be. Circumstances have radically changed for the Taliban since 2001,
and their policies and goals have shifted accordingly. Far from being a
revolutionary movement of the 1990s, prior to 2022, they considered themselves
as a deposed government and the main armed opposition fighting the pro-Western
government supported by foreign soldiers. The Taliban leadership itself has
also been transformed. Circumstances have forced them to travel outside their
villages and also outside the country at times, and they have learned from
their travels.
The
Taliban in 2024
Many
analysts are of the opinion that the Taliban of 2021 are is
different from the earlier Taliban of 2001. While the new leaders
are still committed to their traditional ideology, they have learnt new tactics
for interactions with the rest of the world, especially the non-Islamic
countries. Even today, the command-and-control structure is controlled by the ‘Rahbri
Shoora’ (Grand Council of Leadership), and most of its members are veterans
of the resistance that battled the Western
armies and the Afghan government forces sponsored by the U.S.
and NATO. The Supreme leader of the Taliban, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada is
the ultimate authority on religious, political and military affairs;
and is assisted in his decisions by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a founding
member of the modern Taliban who looks after the political
branch, Mullah Yaqoob (son of Mullah Omar) who heads the military branch, and
Sirajuddin Haqqani (son of guerrilla commander Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani) who
looks after eastern Afghanistan. Non-–Pashtuns
were a part of the Taliban in the 1990s, but now the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras
and Turkmens have made deep inroads into the Taliban hierarchy. The Tajik
leader Qari Deen Muhammed is a member
of the Supreme Council while fellow Tajik Qari Fasihudin is the Chief of the
General Staff of the armed forces, and Uzbek leader Abdul Salam Hanfi from
Faryab is the acting second deputy Prime Minister in the Taliban government.
The Western countries constantly hope for democracy
in Afghanistan. However, this is almost an impossibility in an organization like
the Taliban who are dedicated to the hardline interpretation of Islamic
values. While the Taliban are flexible in the inclusion of ethnic minorities in
their government, their views towards women’s
empowerment has not changed and women are still denied basic rights to obtain
an education or employment. With the passage of time since coming to power, the
Taliban have realized that while one generation defeated the Soviet Union and the latest generation
defeated the combined forces of the USA and NATO,;
administration of a complex country like Afghanistan is extremely difficult. They
need international support to assist the people of their country with their basic human needs, and this cannot be achieved through
isolation from the world.
Since
coming to power, the Taliban has imposed a harsh interpretation of Islamic law
in the country, ignoring their earlier pledges to respect the rights of women,
and religious and ethnic minority communities. Since regaining control, their
actions are reminiscent of their earlier brutal rule of the 1990s, where they
are struggling to provide the people of Afghanistan with adequate food supplies
and other basic needs. Within a period of just 16 months of forming the government, numerous human rights violations have
been recorded against them by the UN mission in Afghanistan. Intimidation of
journalists, restriction of freedom of expression, regular suppression of
demonstrations and forced disappearance of those who protest against their
governance are a regular feature of the Taliban governance. They have
re-established the ‘Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of
Vice’ to implement Islamic law as defined by the Taliban. Restrictions against
women and girls have risen and their access to employment, education, public
interactions and other fundamental rights such as access to justice, have been
heavily curtailed. Flogging of women for ‘moral crimes,’,
physical torture of women’s rights activists, banning them from public parks,
limiting their visits to the markets (compulsorily accompanied by a male
relative as a chaperone) and requiring women to cover their faces in public,;
are contributing to women being erased from public life. According to Mahbouba
Seraj, a women’s rights activist, “‘the
women of Afghanistan went from being part of the society, being doctors,
judges, engineers and officials, to nothing”’
under the Taliban rule. "Even
the most basic right, the Right to Education, has been taken away from them" she has stated.
The new
power structure has wiped out the gains in the standard of living that were
achieved over twenty years of the Western powers’ presence in Afghanistan, with almost all of the population now living
in poverty. Most of the people are suffering from some form of food insecurity
and the situation is becoming more critical with the stoppage of foreign aid.
Violence remains wide-spread with the increased attacks of Taliban by members
of the Islamic State of Khorasan, that add to the public suffering. There is a
rising concern among international observers that the Taliban’s support to
al-Qaeda will pose a continued threat to regional and international security.
Despite the Taliban’s publicly stated policy that they will not allow
Afghanistan to be used as a base for global terrorism, their policy of offering safe haven and increased freedom to the al-Qaeda has not changed. The United Nation’s April 2024 report states that
“al-Qaeda is likely using Afghanistan as a friendly environment to recruit,
train and fund raise,”,
and is suspected to be re-establishing a strong presence in Afghanistan.
